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SHOPPING FOR REVERSALS: 
How Accuracy Differs Across Patent Litigation Forums 
 
Teresa Lii* 
 
This study analyzes the rate of reversal on appeal of each district court for the most 
popular patent litigation forums in the United States. Alarmingly, this study finds that district 
courts which have been shopped for by litigants may also be the courts that are most often 
applying patent law erroneously. Among these districts is the notoriously patentee-friendly 
Eastern District of Texas, which has attracted huge volumes of litigants to its dockets in recent 
years. 
 
Although forum shopping has always antagonized the fairness of civil proceedings, it is 
of special problem in the context of patent litigation. Where billions of dollars may be at stake 
for companies being sued for patent infringement, the equal, fair and standardized application of 
patent law is especially important. However, this study finds that district courts may be applying 
patent law incorrectly at very different rates, with some courts being reversed on appeal at much 
higher rates than others. Because the most popular courts, those that have been “shopped” for, 
also appear to be the courts that are most frequently applying the law incorrectly, in those courts 
there is much greater risk of expenses and inefficiencies associated with the appeals and re-
litigation of remanded cases, and the lack of assurance in not knowing whether the law has been 
correctly applied in any one case. This study can bring more certainty to patent litigators, 
shedding more light on the effect that litigating in a particular forum may have on the ultimate 
outcome of a patent case.  
                                                 
*
 J.D. Candidate, 2013, Columbia Law School. The author would like to thank Professor Ronald Mann for his inputs 
and advice on empirical studies, Timothy Li and Jeremy Xia. 
  
Introduction 
Apple, Yahoo!, Google, Microsoft, Sony, Cingular, FedEx, Nokia, Samsung, 3M, Oracle, 
Skype, Wal-Mart, Honeywell, Nissan, Hyundai, Morgan Stanley, Verizon, Acer, Nintendo, 
Genentech. And the docket goes on.   
 
This is not a list of the most profitable and well-known companies in the United States of 
America, although certainly most of them are Fortune 500 household names. It is not a list of the 
companies with the most advanced technologies or sophisticated products. Rather, it is a list of 
companies that have been sued, in only the past three years, for patent infringement. Another 
thing that these companies have in common is that they were all forced to litigate their patent 
infringement cases in the Eastern District of Texas.  
 
For a company like Apple, worth more than $508 billion in stock,
1
 getting the law right in 
a patent case that could be worth $1.67 billion
2
 is important. Getting the law right in several 
patent suits that could potentially all be worth that amount is even more important. This is the 
situation that these companies are now facing. Yet, because of the notoriously high reversal rate 
attributed to patent litigation, said to be as high as 53%,
3
 none of these companies can ever be 
certain that the law will be properly applied to their cases.  
 
While many studies have attempted to pin down the precise rate of reversal for various 
types of patent cases, no study has yet researched the differential rates of reversal of different 
district courts. This type of research, in light of the recent phenomenon of patent litigation forum 
shopping,
4
 is all the more relevant to today’s patent world. While certain forums, such as the 
Eastern District of Texas, have become spectacularly popular for litigation,
5
 there is little 
evidence that they are getting the law right – i.e., applying the law accurately, in most cases.6 
The idea that a single popular district, deciding a plurality of all patent cases, could be applying 
the law incorrectly in around half of its cases is simply frightening. This is especially true in the 
context of the huge damages verdicts or even settlement amounts determined from what could be 
an incorrect application of the law.  
 
This study analyzes the rate of reversal on appeal to the Federal Circuit of each district 
court for the most popular patent litigation forums in the United States. A high rate of reversal is 
presumed to imply low accuracy. Alarmingly, this study finds that the most populated and well-
known district courts may also be the courts that are most often applying patent law inaccurately. 
                                                 
1
 Zoe Fox, How Much is Apple Worth?, Mashable Business (May 02, 2012) http://mashable.com/2012/05/02/apple-
worth/ (last visited June 16, 2012).  
2
 William McQuillen, Abbott Told to Pay Record $1.67 Billion Award to J&J, Bloomberg L.P. (June 29, 2009 9:32 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aF0Qoxe0JCiw (last visited June 16, 2012). 
3
 Cyber Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissenting).  
4
 Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Forum shopping is defined as the “practice of choosing the most favorable 
jurisdiction or court in which a claim might be heard.” 
5
 Yan Leychkis, Note, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern 
District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 Yale J.L. & Tech. 193, 204 (2007). 
6
 In this study, “accuracy” is construed to mean “in accordance with the Federal Circuit”. This terminology can 
certainly be contested, but as the Federal Circuit has final say in most patent cases, it will be accepted for this study.  
  
These courts include the Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware, which may both 
merit further study and investigation, to discover the factors leading to such high rates of reversal.  
 
Part I provides a brief history of forum shopping within patent litigation. Part II analyzes 
forum shopping within the context of the Eastern District of Texas, which has exploded in 
popularity for patent litigation in the last decade.  Part III then investigates the current statistics 
on patent litigation accuracy, and addresses the specific problems it perpetuates. Part IV provides 
the data and results of an empirical study to determine the rate of reversal on appeal of the 
busiest patent litigation dockets in the United States, and analyzes the rates for significance with 
respect to the average rate of reversal for all dockets.   
I. History of Forum Shopping in Patent Litigation 
Patent litigators have long known that not all district courts were created equal. Patent 
law is governed by federal statute under Title 35 of the United States Code,
7
 and therefore 
presents a federal question that is almost always litigated in federal district courts.
8
 This, in 
addition to the long reach of patent jurisdictional and venue rules, means that patent litigants can 
potentially be hailed into any forum to answer for patent-related claims.
9
 Yet, patent litigation 
has remained concentrated in just a few courts across the nation.
10
 
 
In an ideal world, because of the federal jurisdiction that governs it, patent law would be 
a uniform body of law, with district court judges taking their mandates from Title 35 and clear 
case law precedent.
11
 Perhaps the most important source of precedent in the world of patent 
litigation is the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This Court was created 
out of a Congressional desire for patent law uniformity across district courts.
12
 Indeed, an 
empirical study by David Krohn and Emerson Tiller has established that Federal Circuit case law 
is more frequently cited in patent litigation, and thus presumably more authoritative, than 
Supreme Court patent case law.
13
 However, although the Federal Circuit has considerably 
                                                 
7
 35 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. 
8
 See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any 
Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. No State court shall have 
jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, 
or copyrights.”)  
9
 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (finding federal jurisdiction under a broad set of 
standards.) 
10
 See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. 
L. Rev. 889, 9003 (2001) (finding that “most patent cases are brought in only a handful of jurisdictions.”) 
11
 Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1619, 
1620 (2007). 
12
 The Federal Circuit itself has commented on this mandate: 
The purpose of this Court’s enabling act, the Federal Courts Improvement Act 
of 1982 . . . is to provide a forum that will increase doctrinal stability in the field 
of patent law . . . This Court was created, as contemplated by the Congress, to 
achieve uniformity and to reduce uncertainties in this area.  
Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1573–74 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (internal citation and 
punctuation omitted). 
13
 David R. Pekarek Krohn & Emerson H. Tiller, Federal Circuit Patent Precedent: An Empirical Study of 
Institutional Authority and IP Ideology, 3, Faculty Working Papers, Paper 42, 3 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/facultyworkingpapers/42  (“Using a variety of citation approaches 
  
reduced the “plethora of appellate forums and often-conflicting precedents for patent 
infringement actions,” it has still failed to establish such complete uniformity in patent law.14 
Forum shopping remains rampant in patent litigation, with studies showing that the majority of 
patent litigation is concentrated in a mere handful of district courts.
15
 
 
Built into the United States Code is the option for litigants to pick and choose precisely 
which forum is most convenient for the bringing of a lawsuit. This fact has been central to the 
explosion of forum shopping in present-day patent litigation. According to the United States 
Code, a patent suit may be brought in any venue in which (1) the defendant resides, or (2) where 
the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of 
business.
16
 Prior to 1957, Supreme Court precedent held that patent litigation was exclusively 
governed by § 1400(b) and not broadened by the application of § 1391(c).
17
 In the case of a 
corporate defendant, therefore, the only available forum was the one in which the defendant was 
incorporated.
18
 This limitation, until recently, presumably acted as some measure of deterrent to 
forum shopping in patent litigation.
19
 
 
However, in 1988, Congress amended § 1391(c) to state that a corporate defendant “shall 
be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the 
time the action is commenced.”20 Two years later, the Federal Circuit held in VE Holding Corp. 
v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. that this new definition of “reside” applied not only to the general 
venue statute of § 1391, but also to the patent litigation statute of § 1400(b).
21
 Patent plaintiffs, 
then, were suddenly allowed to bring their suits in any district in which a corporate defendant 
had sufficient minimum contacts so as not to violate traditional notions of fair play and justice.
22
  
                                                                                                                                                             
and statistical tests, we find that federal district courts treat the Federal Circuit as more authoritative (compared to 
the Supreme Court) on patent law, than they treat the regional circuits (compared to the Supreme Court) on 
copyright law.”)  
14
 Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)Certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L. REV. 1161, 1165–71 (2010). 
15
 Moore, supra note 10, at 902–03. 
16
 28 U.S.C. § 1400 (b) (“Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the 
defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established 
place of business.”) 
17
 Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957) (Prior to 1988 amendments, § 1391(c) 
read only that “A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do 
business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for 
venue purposes.”) 
18
 See Manchester Modes, Inc. v. Schuman, 426 F.2d 629, 632 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that “we find it exceedingly 
hard to believe Congress had any idea that by enacting § 1391(c) it was allowing a corporation which did business in 
a multitude of districts to sue in any of them irrespective of the residence of the defendant.”) 
19
 See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1575, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that “the 
‘freezing’ of patent venue as a result of Fourco has made patent venue an anomaly” by “unduly shield[ing] a 
corporate infringer.”) (internal citation omitted). See also Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1444 
(2010) (arguing that restricting venue in patent litigation to a defendant’s principal place of business would decrease 
on forum shopping). 
20
 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). 
21
 See VE Holding Corp., 917 F.2d at 1583–84 (holding that, for patent-related civil suits that did not involve 
infringement claims (e.g. a declaratory judgment suit), the general venue statute of § 1391 applies.) 
22
 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (setting out the present-day test for personal 
jurisdiction requiring a defendant to have minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantive justice).  
  
For all practical purposes, this meant that the doors to every district court in America had been 
thrown wide open to patent litigation. 
 
Yet, litigants soon found that jurisdictional equality in patent litigation was not to be had. 
In then-Professor, now Judge, Kimberly Moore’s landmark 2001 empirical study of forum 
shopping in patent litigation, she confirmed what many already suspected: nearly 50% of all 
patent litigation was concentrated in a mere ten district courts.
23
 Among the top five “chosen” 
districts were the Central District of California, the Northern District of California, and the 
Southern District of New York.
24
 Furthermore, the concentration of litigation in these district 
courts was disproportionately high relative to each of these forums’ general populations, 
suggesting that the large numbers of patent suits filed in these districts could not be explained 
simply by their large populations.
25
 
 
In Moore’s study, she noted that plaintiffs were attracted to different forums for a variety 
of reasons, including, but not limited to, perceived favorability to patentees.
26
 In the Eastern 
District of Virginia, for example, she postulated that plaintiffs there were attracted to the 
relatively short litigation resolution time of 0.43 years.
27
 Regardless of the reasons for plaintiffs’ 
affinities for each district, forum shopping was rampant, suggesting that the Federal Circuit had 
failed to achieve its goal of uniformity in patent law.
28
 
II. The Eastern District of Texas: A Case Study in Present-Day Forum Shopping 
Forum shopping remains alive and well today.
29
 However, as early as 2006, the busiest 
district courts were no longer precisely the same as those identified by Moore.
30
 Certain districts 
are still highly prominent in patent litigation, including the Southern District of New York, the 
Eastern District of Virginia, and the District of New Jersey.
31
 Others, including the Southern 
District of Florida and the District of Minnesota have decreased in traffic, while the Northern 
District of Illinois has decreased in importance.
32
 Perhaps the most important development, 
                                                 
23
 Moore, supra note 10, at 902–03. 
24
 Id. 
25
 Id. at 904. 
26
 See id. at 916–17 (In Judge Moore’s study, patentees prevailed in 58% of all patent cases from 1995 to 1999. 
However, some of the busiest districts, including the Districts of Massachusetts and Delaware, evidenced relatively 
low patentee win rates. Thus, the favorability of a particular forum to the patentee (and plaintiff, and thus forum 
selector in most situations) could not explain all instances of forum shopping.); contra, Scott Atkinson, Alan Marco 
& John Turner, The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, 
52 J.L. & Econ. 411, 438 (2009) (a 2009 study arguing that forum shopping on the basis of validity rates ceased in 
the 1970s.) As will be discussed infra, Moore found that forum shopping in her study was the result of a variety of 
factors that may or may not include a forum’s patent validity rates. 
27
 See id. at 907–08.  
28
 See id. at 893. 
29
 See e.g. Chester S. Chuang, Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of Declaratory Judgment to Forum Shop in Patent 
Litigation, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1065,(2012); Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38:4 AIPLA Q.J. 
1 (2010); Roderick R. McKelvie, Forum Selection in Patent Litigation: A Traffic Report for 2006, Covington & 
Burling (2007); Alisha K. Taylor, Note, What Does Forum Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas Mean for 
Patent Reform?, 6 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 570 (2007).. 
30
 See McKelvie, supra note 30, at 2 (listing the top ten districts for patent filings in fiscal year 2006). 
31
 See Lemley, supra note 30, at 6. 
32
 Id. 
  
however, is the rise of the Eastern District of Texas as the newest, and most notorious, go-to 
forum for patent plaintiffs.
33
 
 
This forum, a so-called “rocket docket”34 has been hailed as the answer to litigants’ 
prayers for speedy, efficient, and overwhelmingly plaintiff-friendly relief.
35
 The Eastern District 
of Texas’s appeal lies chiefly in two factors: the speed and efficiency of its local patent litigation 
rules, and its perceived favorability to plaintiffs in terms of verdicts and verdict amounts.
36
 
 
In the first instance, the Eastern District of Texas has adopted a specialized set of patent 
litigation rules that lays out stringent requirements for the submission of documents. These rules 
and deadlines are meant to hurry along the normally arduous road to trial.
37
 Soon after the 
commencement of litigation, each party must submit preliminary documents that restrict the 
litigation to the listed claims and patents.
38
 Parties must also confer to develop a “Joint Claim 
Construction and Prehearing Statement” setting forth the construction of the undisputed claim 
terms, as well as each party’s proposed construction for the disputed terms.39 The enforcement of 
strict deadlines has considerably lowered the average time to trial in the Eastern District of Texas 
relative to the national averages in both bench and jury trial situations.
40
 The Eastern District of 
Texas promises speedier resolution of patent infringement cases, thereby offering potential 
plaintiffs the promise of being able to save on legal fees and litigation costs. Additionally, these 
rules may also confer a distinct advantage to the plaintiff-patentee, who prepares in advance of 
                                                 
33
 See id.; Leychkis, supra note 5, at 204; Taylor, supra note 30, at 580–82.  
34
 Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). A rocket docket is defined as: “A court or judicial district known for its 
speedy disposition of cases.” 
35
 See Leychkis, supra note 5; Taylor, supra note 29; see also Alan Cohen, From PI to IP, IP L. & Bus., Nov. 2005 
at 36; Bob Cote & Rodger Sadler, Survival Strategies in the New IP Economy, Managing Intell. Prop., at 26, June 
2006. 
36
 See Leychkis, supra note 5, at 232 (“While some commentators have praised the Eastern District for the expertise 
of its judges, the special patent rules, and the quick adjudication of patent disputes, others have raised concerns over 
the abnormally high plaintiffs' win rate and the highly attenuated connections between many of the litigants and the 
district.”). 
37
 Local Rules for the Eastern District of Texas: Appendix M Patent Rules, available at 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=1179&download=true [hereafter E.D. of Tex. 
Rules]; see also Andrei Iancu & Jay Chung, Real Reasons the Eastern District of Texas Draws Patent Cases—
Beyond Lore and Anecdote, 14 SMU Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 299 (2011). 
38
 E.D. of Tex. Rules, supra note 37, at 3-1–3-6(At the start of litigation, each party must submit a document 
including all “Infringement Contentions” and all “Invalidity Contentions,” which are then generally deemed to be 
that party’s final contentions throughout trial.) 
39
 Id. at 4-3. 
40
 Shahnaz Mahmud, See Y’all Real Soon!, Managing Intell. Prop., Oct. 2006 (reporting that, on average, bench 
trials in the Eastern District of Texas resolve in 22.3 months compared to 37.8 months nationwide, while jury trials 
resolve in 21.1 months compared to 27.1 months nationwide).  But see Tresa Baldas, Texas IP Rocket Docket 
Headed for Burnout?, Nat’l L.J., Dec. 28, 2004 (commenting that the average time to trial in the Eastern District of 
Texas has increased as the patent dockets are flooded by new cases); see also U.S. District Courts Civil Cases 
Commenced, By Nature of Suit and District, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx (a comparison of Table C-10 (or T-3 in later years) from 
various years showing that the median time from filing to trial in the Eastern District of Texas has been steadily 
increasing since 2004). 
  
filing suit in this forum with well-prepared litigation materials, against the defendant-infringer, 
who must then scramble to meet the deadlines and shortened litigation schedule.
41
 
 
However, the local patent rules alone do not explain all of the Eastern District of Texas’s 
appeal. Other district courts have adopted similar rules, but have failed to attract the same 
amount of patent litigation.
42
 The second reason for this forum’s popularity is that the Eastern 
District of Texas has gained a reputation for being overwhelmingly plaintiff-friendly, in both the 
likelihood of a verdict favoring the plaintiff, as well as the size of the damages awarded to that 
plaintiff.
43
 One study has reported an average plaintiff win rate as high as 92% for this district;
44
 
as compared to a national average between 59%
45–68%,46 this statistic can easily explain a 
would-be plaintiff’s attraction to this forum. 
 
Furthermore, plaintiffs can look forward not only to favorable verdicts, but also “Texas-
sized” damages awards.47 For example, a jury in this district awarded the jaw-dropping amount 
of $1.67 billion to Centocor, Inc., a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, in a patent infringement 
suit against Abbott Laboratories—the largest patent infringement verdict ever.48 Such verdicts 
are generally attributed to the plaintiff-friendly juries, because these juries reportedly display 
trust in the government’s decisions about its property, manifested in the presumption of validity 
for a patent granted to a patentee-plaintiff by the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
49
 
Thus, a jury in the Eastern District of Texas may be relatively more likely than a jury in other 
districts to award large damages against corporate infringer-defendants. This high plaintiff win 
rate also means that even a plaintiff with a shaky case will be incentivized to file in this forum, in 
hopes of pressuring the defendant into favorable settlement negotiations in an effort to deter the 
enormous costs of litigation.
50
  
 
                                                 
41
 See Leychkis, supra note 5, at 209 (noting that defendants in the Eastern District of Texas only receive nine 
months to complete discovery, which somewhat biases the system toward plaintiffs).  
42
 The Western District of Pennsylvania, for example, adopted similar rules in 2005, United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania, Local Patent Rules, available online at 
http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Forms/LocalPatentRules.pdf. However, the number of patent filings in 
that district has not significantly increased; see U.S. District Courts Civil Cases Commenced, By Nature of Suit and 
District, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, supra note 40. 
43
 See Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2006. 
44
 Cote & Sadler, supra note 35, at 26. See also Creswell, supra note 43 (reporting a plaintiff win rate of 78% in the 
Eastern District of Texas according to LegalMetric data). 
45
 Creswell, supra note 43 (reported according to LegalMetric data).  
46
 See Cohen, supra note 35 (reported according to LegalMetric data). 
47
 Creswell, supra note 43. 
48
See McQuillen, supra note 2. This verdict was later thrown out on appeal when the Federal Circuit invalidated the 
patent at issue. Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011). However, the size of 
the verdict remains a testament to this forum’s willingness to award damages in unprecedented amounts. 
49
 See Susan Decker, Texas District is Heaven for Patent Holders Under Siege, Seattle Times, May 1, 2006 (quoting 
Judge Ward to say that “[p]roperty rights and respect for government resonate particularly strongly in East Texas”). 
50
 See Creswell, supra note 43 (“Those odds are daunting enough to encourage many corporate defendants to settle 
before setting foot in Marshall”); see also Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass’n, Report of the Economic Survey (2009) 
(Patent suits with more than $1 million at issue generally cost between $3 million and $6 million to litigate, so it is 
not unreasonable that a defendant would prefer to settle rather than carry a case to trial and bear attorney, expert 
witness and other related costs.). 
  
The aforementioned overwhelming rate of plaintiff-friendliness in the Eastern District of 
Texas, relative to other district courts raises an immediate red flag when compared to the lower 
plaintiff win rates exhibited by other districts. Even more cause for suspicion is that studies have 
found that, between 2002-2004, patentee-plaintiffs in other districts were usually less likely than 
defendants to prevail in patent infringement suits.
51
 Those that did prevail, usually appeared to be 
in strong financial shape, with financial support at least equivalent to the accused infringer-
defendant.
52
 In the Eastern District of Texas, where many patentee-plaintiffs are non-practicing 
entities (pejoratively termed “patent trolls”) whose primary assets are patents,53 it seems unlikely 
that plaintiffs fulfill this correlational condition. Regardless of the reasons why, there is no 
question that the Eastern District of Texas has prominently displayed a welcome mat to plaintiffs 
who desire a speedy and favorable resolution to their patent claims, and which may have led to 
some of this highly anomalous behavior. 
 
Speed and plaintiff-friendliness can be reasonable justifications for seeking a forum with 
a fast-moving docket.
54
 For these reasons, forum shopping, as the Fourth Circuit has noted, may 
not be inherently evil.
55
 Even the Supreme Court has spoken on the issue, remarking that even 
without resorting to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),
56
 a plaintiff always has the option of “shopping for a 
forum with the most favorable law.”57 Thus, there is a general, if resigned, recognition that some 
degree of forum shopping will be inevitable in the American legal system. However, 
commentators have recognized a multitude of problems that may ensue from forum shopping in 
patent litigation.
58
 Among these are issues of inefficiency.
59
 If the application of patent law is 
inconsistent across litigation forums, the resulting uncertainty regarding the scope of patent 
holders’ scopes of exclusivity will divert resources away from invention of new patents to 
enforcement of existing patents.
60
 Furthermore, as litigants battle over which forum is the most 
appropriate for each patent suit, inefficiencies and costs associated with venue fights will 
accrue.
61
 Finally, the greatest concern is that of fairness. This may pose a special problem in 
patent litigation, an area of the law that is already riddled with inaccuracy, by perpetuating and 
magnifying erroneous applications of the law.  
                                                 
51
 See Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (2006). 
52
 Id. at 26. 
53
 Creswell, supra note 43. 
54
 See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the Patent Rocket Docket: An Empirical Study of Infringement 
Litigation 1985–2000, 11 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 58, 61–70 (2011) (arguing that litigants are attracted to 
different rocket dockets for various reasons, including speed, efficiency and reputation for plaintiff-friendliness).  
55
 Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 512 n.12 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What’s 
Wrong with That?, 24 Q.L.R. 25, 25 (2005); Stowell R. R. Kelner, Note, “Adrift on an Uncharted Sea”: A Survey of 
Section 1404(a) Transfer in the Federal System, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 612, 638 (1992). 
56
 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) authorizes a district court to transfer a case to any other district or division where it might 
have been brought “[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 
57
 See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 527 (1990); see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 
779 (1984) (upholding plaintiff forum shopping for a favorable statute of limitations because it was akin to forum 
shopping for favorable substantive or procedural rules, or jury pool). 
58
 Carter G. Phillips, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lecture, 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1467, 1472 (2009) (remarking that 
forum shopping is “already a serious problem in patent litigation”). 
59
 Moore, supra note 10, at 924. 
60
 Moore, supra note 10, at 928. 
61
 Id. at 926; see also David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute: Part II, 36 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 268, 307 (1969) (writing that “[t]he theory [of venue transfer] is good, but it is practically unworkable . . . 
deciding where the [most convenient] forum is costs altogether too much time and money.”). 
  
III. The Special Problem of Accuracy in Patent Litigation  
 Forum shopping confounds and complicates litigation by selectively creating pockets of 
district courts that apply the law in a nonuniform manner. This is in addition to the problem that 
patent suits already face of accurate application of the law. The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that patent law is an extremely complex field, especially for those without training 
in science and technology.
62
 Most frequently, district court judges, who must manage their patent 
dockets and decide essential issues of patent law, usually do not have such training in science 
and technology.
63
 This lack of special training in those who have been appointed to adjudicate 
this field may make patent law especially volatile and inaccurate. 
 
Contributing to this impression is a widespread belief that patent litigation exhibits the 
highest reversal rates out of all types of civil litigation.
64
 Numerous studies have detailed the 
high rates of reversal and unpredictable results of patent litigation holdings on appeal, with a 
multitude of studies citing a reversal rate between 30–50% for claim construction.65 The Federal 
Circuit publishes its own statistics on the rate of U.S. District Court decision reversals, with 
annual averages generally ranging between 10–20%.66  However, these rates do not seem to 
differentiate between patent cases and other types of cases. Furthermore, these statistics most 
likely include rulings on motions and other types of dispositions, but do not include partial 
affirmances that result in remands, and as such are not a wholly accurate reflection of the Federal 
Circuit’s reversal rate on patent issues.67 Thus, Chief Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit may not 
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Tech. & Pol’y 1, 105-106 (outlining several reasons, including a lack of scientific backgrounds or special training in 
patent law, why district judges struggle with patent cases as generalists of the law). 
64
 See Sichelman, supra note 14, at 1173 (comparing the relatively high reversal rate of patent litigation (claim 
construction cases not resulting in summary affirmances) to the average reversal rate of 26.2% for all types of civil 
litigation combined (citing Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism 
in the Federal Courts, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (2011))). 
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reversed at much higher rates than other issues at 40-50%); Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial 
Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance From the Federal Circuit, 33 Seton Hall L. Rev. 711, 746 
(2003) (reporting a 41.5% claim construction reversal rate on appeal exclusively in 2001); but see Ronald J. Mann & 
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Sichelman, supra note 14, at 1175 (“the average reversal rate across all issues other than claim construction is 18 
percent,” suggesting that other issues of patent law are not nearly as indeterminate or inconsistently applied as claim 
construction). 
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 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending, available at 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/statistics.html. 
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 Sichelman, supra note 14, at 1186. 
  
have been exaggerating when he wrote that the patent “reversal rate, hovering near 50%, is the 
worst possible. Even a rate that was much higher would provide greater certainty.”68 
 
Claim construction may simply be a particularly vague and indeterminate area of patent 
law,
69
 a problem which is further compounded by the fact that it is reviewed on a de novo 
standard on appeal.
70
 Unfortunately, because claim construction defines the scope and meaning 
of the patent at issue, most patent cases settle after a claim construction hearing, when the parties 
have gained some idea of how a court will ultimately rule on the merits of the case.
71
 
Furthermore, because claim construction is often performed at an early stage in a patent suit, 
errors at this early stage are amplified in later stages of the litigation proceedings, ultimately 
impacting future determinations of invalidity or infringement.
72
 Therefore, the high reversal rate 
for claim construction is still a cause for alarm, as it implies that many settlements are affected 
by a faulty claim construction.  The high reversal rate for claim construction alone, then, may 
speak to a general judicial inability to properly apply and utilize patent law. 
 
Regardless of the origins, it should be alarming to patent litigation practitioners and 
litigants, and especially to defendants, that patent litigation has such a reputation as being so 
error-prone and unpredictable. Judge Holderman of the Northern District of Illinois lamented 
that “[t]his unpredictability may encourage litigants . . . (1) to pursue the litigation process to the 
hilt through expensive discovery, pretrial proceedings, trial and appeal or (2) in the alternative, to 
settle early a case upon which they may have otherwise prevailed to minimize the costs of 
litigation.” 73  Chief Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit additionally remarked that the vast 
expenses of litigation “can force accused infringers to acquiesce to non-meritorious claims.”74  
 
This is a problem on several fronts. First, for the cases that actually go to trial, it is 
obvious that inaccurate application of the law results in the setting of inaccurate precedent that, 
accumulated, will have an increasingly skewing and negative effect on the entire body of patent 
law. This may be the case even though some cases may be reversed on appeal, because 95% of 
patent suits never make it to trial,
75
 and instead settle, most likely at least partly under the 
shadow of case law precedent.
76
 If this precedent is inaccurate, then a certain percentage of those 
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cases will have settled because one party was given a legally-inaccurate – that is, a legally 
uncertain – advantage.77 This may encourage more litigants to file suits with little or no merit.78 
  
To take such issues to their practical conclusions, for patent plaintiffs, winning a suit in a 
district exhibiting a high rate of reversal does not mean that the litigation is over; rather, it 
indicates that the judgment has a high likelihood of being overturned on appeal. On the other 
hand, a defendant may feel pressured to settle a patent case to avoid the high costs of litigation, 
even if the defendant’s case could win on the merits, due to the great uncertainties stemming 
from high rates of reversal in the district court where that case has been filed. In turn, the 
American legal system will be confounded by excessive litigation and legal inefficiencies, as 
district courts attempt again and again to correctly interpret and apply patent law and are 
reversed again and again on appeal, despite the fact that “Intellectual Property cases” already 
cost 62% higher than other types of civil litigation.
79
 Therefore, any patent litigator preparing to 
file or defend a suit in a particular forum would rightly be concerned to discover that that forum 
exhibits a high rate of reversal.  
IV. Empirical Analysis of Patent Litigation Reversal Rates by District Court 
In order to more deeply study the effect of forum shopping on the accuracy of patent 
litigation, an empirical study was performed to test the reversal rate of each of the busiest 
districts for patent litigation. A high rate of reversal presumably implies that a certain forum is 
applying the law incorrectly, while a low rate of reversal would imply that that forum is more 
accurate. First, the twenty busiest districts for patent litigation were identified, and the rate of 
reversal was determined for each of these district courts. Then, statistical analysis was performed 
on the collected data to determine whether and in which districts the rate of reversal was 
significantly different at the 95% confidence level from the overall rate of reversal of all courts 
studied.
80
 
A. Dataset and Methodology 
 In order to identify the busiest districts for patent litigation, the origin of each case in the 
four most recent bound volumes, volumes 93 through 96, of the United States Patent Quarterly, 
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was recorded, and the totals for each district were tabulated. Only cases that dealt with patents 
and that were decided on the merits of the patent-in-suit were included. The twenty courts with 
the most cases were selected for further study. 
 
For each district court, the rate of reversal was then studied. The dataset originated from 
WestlawNext,
81
 by searching the name of the district court in the Federal Circuit database. Each 
case originating from that court that was decided by the Federal Circuit between March 2012 and 
January 2009,
82
 inclusive, was recorded, as long as it dealt with patents and was decided on the 
merits of the patent-in-suit.
83
 Cases that were affirmed, including summary affirmances, were 
recorded as “Affirmed,” and cases that were reversed either in part or in whole were recorded as 
“Reversed.” Cases wherein the Federal Circuit’s decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court 
were included as “Affirmed,” while cases where the Federal Circuit’s decision was reversed 
were excluded from the dataset.
84
 When all of the cases had been collected, the percentage of 
cases marked as reversed was then calculated for each district court.  
 
Statistical analysis was then performed to determine whether the rate of reversal was 
significant for each district in comparison to the overall rate of reversal. Two types of tests of 
two proportions were utilized. First, the rate of reversal of each district court was tested against 
the overall weighted average rate of reversal of all cases studied, to determine whether that 
district’s rate of reversal was significantly different from the rate in all districts studied. The 
second type tested the rate of reversal of each district court against the rate of reversal of all 
courts summed, minus that court, to ensure that the first test did not give disproportionate weight 
to that district court in calculating the overall rate of reversal.  
B. Results 
The twenty busiest district courts selected are shown in Figure 1 below, with the 
respective number of cases in the USPQ, volumes 93–96. Notable for the large amount of 
appeals from that court are the Eastern District of Texas (thirteen cases), the District of Delaware 
(ten cases), the Central District of California (nine cases), and the Eastern District of Virginia 
and the Southern District of New York (eight cases each). At the other end of the spectrum, with 
only two appeals each, are the District of Arizona, the Eastern District of New York, the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, and the Northern District of Illinois.  
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Fig. 1. Twenty busiest district courts selected for further study from the USPQ, 
shown with their respective number of cases from volumes 93-96 of the USPQ. 
 
For each of the district courts, the cases tabulated from the WestlawNext search are 
summarized below. The Eastern District of Texas was the origin of 49 cases, the most out of all 
the districts studied, with the Central District of California (45 cases), the District of Delaware 
(43 cases) and the Northern District of California (40 cases) following closely behind. The 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Eastern District of New York and the District of Colorado 
exhibited the lowest numbers of cases on appeal, at only three cases each.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Number of cases found in WestlawNext to determine rate of reversal on appeal. 
 
The rate of reversal for each district court yielding more than ten cases on appeal based 
on the cases summarized in Figure 2 is shown below. The courts with the highest rate of reversal 
include the District of Massachusetts (61.5%), the Eastern District of Texas (55.1%), and the 
  
District of Delaware (51.2%).
85
 The court with the lowest rate of reversal was the Northern 
District of Illinois, at only 16%. The weighted average rate of reversal was 37.8%, while the non-
weighted average was 40.8%.
86
 For purposes of the creation of this chart, only cases exhibiting 
more than ten cases on appeal are shown, although all districts were included for purposes of 
calculating the average and weighted average rate of reversal on appeal.
87
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Rate of reversal on appeal for each district court for cases decided between 
January 2009 and March 2012, showing the districts with ten or more cases.  
 
The results of significance testing are summarized below in Figure 4. Because the results 
were not significantly different for testing against the overall average and testing against all 
districts excluding the tested district, meaning that the exclusion of a single district would not 
impact the test significantly, only the results for the former test are shown.  
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District P-Score v. Overall Average Rate of Reversal 
Eastern District of Texas 0.022 
Massachusetts 0.084 
Delaware 0.096 
District of Columbia 0.551 
Southern District of Texas 0.887 
Northern District of California 0.501 
New Jersey 0.550 
Central District of California 0.218 
Southern District of New York  0.285 
Western District of Wisconsin 0.442 
Southern District of Florida 0.251 
Eastern District of Virginia 0.251 
Northern District of Illinois 0.005 
Fig. 4. Significance testing against both weighted average rate of reversal and average of 
district courts not including the tested court.  
 
 As highlighted in the chart, only two district courts had a reversal rate that was 
significantly different from the average reversal rate.
88
 The Eastern District of Texas exhibited 
right-tailed significance, which means that the rate of reversal was significantly not lower than 
the overall rate, while the Northern District of Illinois exhibited left-tailed significance, meaning 
that its rate of reversal was significantly not higher than the overall rate.
 89
 In other words, the 
Eastern District of Texas had a rate of reversal that was most likely significantly higher than the 
overall average rate of reversal, while the Northern District of Illinois had a rate that was most 
likely significantly lower. This result is particularly interesting, as it confirms the negative 
impression that has been detailed above regarding the Eastern District of Texas with all of its 
notoriety: despite the plaintiff-friendliness and speed with which this district resolves cases, and 
which has drawn litigants to it, it may well be that this district is more inaccurate at applying 
patent law than other districts. 
 
As an additional method of analyzing the data, the hypothetical total number of cases that 
would be reversed from each district, were all cases to be appealed, was calculated. The result of 
this calculation will be termed the meta-reversal number. This number is important as it allows 
for an estimate of just how many patent cases are being adjudicated erroneously each year. 
District courts may have highly variable rates of appeal, which would mean that from each 
district, the raw rate of reversal may not be wholly indicative of exactly how many cases are 
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being wrongly decided from each district. Thus, for example, if the rate of reversal for District A 
was 10%, but a total of 1000 cases was filed in District A, the meta-reversal number would be 
100 cases; however, if District B’s rate of reversal was 50%, but only 100 cases were filed in 
District B, then District B’s meta-reversal number would be 50 cases. Even though District B’s 
rate of reversal is 50% as compared to District A’s 10%, District A would still exhibit a higher 
number of cases that would hypothetically be reversed, if all of them were to be appealed. Thus, 
District A would still be greater cause for concern to litigants and attorneys seeking a legally-
correct and valid judgment, as it would appear to yield a much higher raw number of incorrectly 
adjudicated cases.  
 
To calculate the meta-reversal number for each district, the total number of cases filed in 
each district court in the time period examined by this study (August 2005 and December 
2008)
90
 was multiplied by the rate of reversal. The results are shown in Figure 5 below. As is 
evident in the chart, the meta-reversal numbers are similar to the raw rates of reversal. The 
Eastern District of Texas and Delaware, two of the most popular patent litigation districts, have 
the highest meta-reversal numbers, suggesting that these districts are adjudicating the largest 
number of cases incorrectly. The District of Columbia, however, despite having a high raw rate 
of reversal, does not contribute many incorrectly-decided cases to the overall number of cases 
that are hypothetically decided wrongly every year, since very few cases are filed there.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Total number of cases that would be reversed from each district if all cases are 
appealed, showing courts with ten or more appeals. 
 
From a combination of Figures 4 and 5, the Eastern District of Texas has both the highest 
rate of reversal and the highest raw number of cases that is decided incorrectly (the meta-reversal 
number). The District of Delaware may be another cause for concern, since both of these 
numbers are high as well. Both of these districts may have disproportionately large impacts on 
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 This was calculated by searching through each district court’s docket on BloombergLaw’s Docket Search for 
patent cases that had been filed between August 2005 and December 2008, where the nature of the suit was marked 
“Property Rights - Patent [*830].” 
  
the nationwide total number of cases decided incorrectly, by contributing many cases to that 
number. Not only do these districts decide many of their cases incorrectly, but they are also the 
districts in which a large number of cases are litigated. Thus, they are the districts that are most 
negatively impacting the accuracy of patent litigation outcomes. The District of Massachusetts, 
despite having the highest rate of reversal in Figure 4, has a low meta-reversal, implying that it 
probably does not adjudicate enough cases to have a large impact on the nationwide number of 
cases that are hypothetically wrongly decided.  
 
Finally, in order to test whether the rate of reversal was correlated with any of the 
variables that are generally associated with patent litigation forums (such as time to trial and 
patentee win rate), the reversal rates acquired in this study for all districts were graphed against 
such variables on a scatterplot, and the R-squared value for each resulting trendline was 
calculated.
91
 Variables were taken from Mark Lemley, “Where to File Your Patent Case,” and 
included the time to trial, percent of cases going to trial, and patentee win rate.
92
 Another 
variable tested was the percent of cases appealed. This was calculated by searching through each 
district court’s docket on BloombergLaw’s Docket Search for patent cases that had been filed 
between August 2005 and December 2008
93
 and had been appealed to the Federal Circuit at least 
once. Additionally, the reversal rates were also graphed against the total number of cases pulled 
for each district court, to ensure that there was no self-selection bias (i.e. that the courts with 
more cases naturally had more reversals or less reversals). The graphs for this test can be found 
in Appendix I. The only significant result, however, is that none of the variables showed any 
correlation to the reversal rate.
94
 Therefore, the reversal rate cannot be explained by any other 
variable. This suggests that the courts themselves may have special attributes which should be 
studied in greater detail to ascertain the specific factors leading to high or low rates of reversal, 
i.e., high or low rates of accuracy. 
Conclusion 
An empirical analysis of the reversal rate on appeal of the twenty busiest district courts 
produced several significant results. First, the overall reversal rate among these courts is 37.8%, 
which is similar to results that have been produced by previous case studies. Second, most of the 
district courts produce reversal rates that are not significantly different from the overall average 
within the top 20 districts. Only three district courts were significantly different from the average 
rate at a two-tailed 95% confidence level. The reversal rate of the Northern District of Illinois 
perhaps merits further study, as it appears to have achieved a significantly lower rate of reversal 
than any of the other courts, including the Southern District of New York and the Northern 
District of California, both of which are traditionally considered highly influential in patent law.  
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Most importantly, the results show that the Eastern District of Texas is reversed on 
appeal at an extremely high rate, comparatively, and is one of only two courts to exhibit a rate of 
reversal that is significantly not lower than the average rate, at a two-tailed significance level. 
Without further study, it is difficult to draw conclusions from this data. However, it means that 
perhaps this district deserves its notorious reputation as being overly patentee-friendly – this very 
patentee-friendliness, and the anomalous patterns of litigation that have been recorded from the 
Eastern District of Texas, may in fact be lending themselves to a greater likelihood of 
adjudicating cases inaccurately. If this were to be the case, then patentees would be well-advised 
to be cautious when filing in this circuit, as its application of patent law, despite being friendlier 
to plaintiffs, may ultimately be mistaken.  
 
Finally, these reversal rates cannot be explained by any other variables traditionally 
associated with reasons behind patent litigation forum shopping. This suggests that they are a 
standalone phenomenon. In order to prevent further accumulation of needless costs and 
inefficiencies, it may be wise to take note of them, as they surely deserve greater in-depth study. 
 
 
  
Appendix I: Rate of reversal on appeal graphed against other potentially explanatory 
variables. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
Appendix II: Study Data 
 
District Total 
Cases
95
 
Total 
Appeals 
% Cases 
Appealed 
Patentee 
Win 
Rate
96
 
Cases 
Going to 
Trial
97
 
Time to 
Trial 
(years)
98
 
Rate of 
Reversal, Jan 
2009-Mar 2012 
Number 
of Cases 
in Study 
EDTX 1030 90 8.7% 40.3% 8.0% 1.24 55.10% 49 
CDCA 911 70 7.7% 36.3% 1.5% 0.89 28.89% 45 
NJ 550 38 6.9% 21.0% 2.1% 1.14 32.00% 25 
NDCA 548 35 6.4% 26.0% 3.1% 1.28 32.50% 40 
DE 519 68 13.1% 45.3% 11.8% 1.05 51.16% 43 
NDIL 486 17 3.5% 32.6% 1.6% 0.95 16.00% 25 
SDNY 383 32 8.4% 37.0% 1.6% 1.12 27.27% 22 
MA 219 19 8.7% 38.4% 6.2% 1.29 61.54% 13 
SDCA 219 25 11.4% 27.3% 3.1% 1.03 50.00% 4 
SDFL 205 25 12.2% 27.8% 4.4% 0.83 25.00% 16 
EDMI 204 19 9.3% 25.0% 2.1% 1.10 22.22% 9 
WDWI 203 41 20.2% 24.0% 7.4% 0.56 27.27% 11 
MDFL 186 8 4.3% 46.3% 4.0% 0.89 50.00% 6 
EDVA 162 20 12.3% 30.4% 6.4% 0.64 25.00% 16 
EDPA 149 6 4.0% 27.3% 1.5% 1.32 66.67% 3 
CO 132 5 3.8% 25.0% 2.2% 0.88 100.00% 3 
AZ 125 4 3.2% 30.3% 2.6% 1.28 25.00% 4 
EDNY 119 7 5.9% 17.6% 0.9% 1.13 33.33% 3 
SDTX 109 10 9.2% 29.3% 3.5% 1.06 40.00% 10 
DC  84 16 19.0% 26.5% 0% 1.14 46.15% 13 
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